DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-128/81

phi-13

11 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center

Chairman, Technical Surveillance

Countermeasures Subcommittee

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FROM:

Acting Chairman

SUBJECT:

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- 1. Attached for your concurrence is andraft answer to Theodore Brown, Director, Office of Security, International Communications Agency (formerly USIA), who requested observer status on SECOM.
- 2. Since the draft points out the ICA's non-NFIB status and points him to the SSC, Mr. Moroney's concurrence is requested. To make the rejection easier, it would be appreciated if the SSC would establish early contact with Mr. Brown.
- 3. The ICA appears to have a very active ACM program and for this reason I mention our TSCS and inform Mr. Brown that we will keep USICA in mind. I would not object if C/TSCS cares to make exploratory contact with Mr. Brown. If it seems desirable from the Community standpoint to have USICA enjoy observer status on the TSCS, let me know and we'll review.

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Attachment

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-122/81

7 May 1981

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Mr. Theodore Brown

Director, Office of Security

International Communications Agency

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Acting Chairman

SUBJECT:

Observer Status on SECOM Subcommittees

REFERENCE:

Your letter to me dated 27 April 1981

- 1. Thank you for your letter (reference) and the information on USICA security concerns. Your desire to improve your organization's skills in security matters is commendable. I believe that the best way to do that, and to satisfy ongoing security needs of your agency, would be to follow established procedures under which USICA, as a non-member of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), comes under the security cognizance of CIA. A significant function of CIA's Special Security Center is to provide security support advice and services to non-NFIB agencies. I suggest that you direct any particular security concerns you may have to that center. By this means the Special Security Center can tailor security measures to your particular needs.
- 2. The DCI Security Committee (SECOM) subcommittee in which you seem most interested--the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS)--is substantially involved in sensitive technical development and operational matters. I do not believe it would be fully consistent with the need-to-know principle to open the TSCS to observers from departments and agencies without operational responsibilities. I am asking the TSCS Chairman to keep USICA security interests in mind and to inform you through appropriate channels of matters affecting your agency.

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International Communication Agency

United States of America

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Washington, D. C. 20547

April 27, 1981

25 X 1	Dear
25X1	As recently discussed with of your office, the following information is submitted as background for the purpose of defining our requirements for requesting observer status on the subcommittees and working groups of the DCI Security Committee. It is significant to note that previous Agency policy restricted our participation in such activities, however, I am pleased to report that this is no longer an impediment and I am looking forward to the mutual benefit that can be derived from closer coordination.
	The United States International Communication Agency (USICA), formerly the United States Information Agency, was officially established under the President's Reorganization Plan No. 2 on April 1, 1978. The Agency's "mandate," as specified in the enclosed fact sheets, relates solely to an unclassified end product. However, the information needed to carry out our mission is derived from a myriad of sources and includes highly sensitive national security information received from the intelligence community. The nature and sensitivity of this information spans the gamut from Limited Official Use through Top Secret, including compartmentalized material such as cryptographic, SI and TK. As I am sure you are aware, it is incumbent upon the Director, USICA, to protect this information in a manner commensurate with the laws and statutes governing the originating agency. This authority is delegated to the Office of Security and we are responsible to the Director, USICA for all matters concerning the protection of such information.
	Our office is comprised of three divisions: Physical Security which provides for the protection of information, personnel and property;
25X1	Acting Chairman, DCI Security Committee
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Investigations which carries out the investigative work necessary to the issuance and continuance of clearances; and Personnel Security which evaluates investigative data and issues or denies clearances. In this regard, each employee is subjected to a background investigation and personal interview before being employed or assigned to duty and, except for foreign national employees, all personnel meet the requirements for either a Secret or Top Secret clearance.

It is our desire to not only maintain a capacity to prevent possible physical or technical penetration of our premises in Washington, New York and other locations in the U.S. and overseas, but also to continue to improve our skill in this regard. We maintain an active technical security and audio countermeasures program which includes an automated in-place RF monitoring facility, portable monitoring capability and an electronics laboratory. Members of my staff also participate as observers on several interagency security committees such as the Special Committee on Compromising Emanations, chaired by the National Security Agency.

I believe it is extremely important from the standpoint of national security to be in the mainstream of the Federal Government's interest in these countermeasure activities and that this can best be achieved by observing and working closely with each of the committees and subcommittees having this common concern.

In the event you wish to further discuss this request, I am at your disposal and will appear before your Committee to answer any questions that you or your Committee may have. Any assistance you may be able to render in this matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Theodore Brown, Director

Office of Security

Enclosures: (New Fact Sheet)

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